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UNTIL 3:30 P.M., EDT

JUNE 21, 1973

Office of the White House Press Secretary

BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FURTHER
LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS

The President of the United States of America, Richard Nixon, and the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the CPSU, L. I. Brezhnev,

Having thoroughly considered the question of the further limitation of strategic arms, and the progress already achieved in the current negotiations,

Reaffirming their conviction that the earliest adoption of further limitations of strategic arms would be a major contribution in reducing the danger of an outbreak of nuclear war and in strengthening international peace and security,

Have agreed as follows:

First. The two Sides will continue active negotiations in order to work out a permanent agreement on more complete measures on the limitation of strategic offensive arms, as well as their subsequent reduction, proceeding from the Basic Principles of Relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics signed in Moscow on May 29, 1972, and from the Interim Agreement between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of May 26, 1972 on Certain Measures with Respect to the Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms.

Over the course of the next year the two Sides will make serious efforts to work out the provisions of the permanent agreement on more complete measures on the limitation of strategic offensive arms with the objective of signing it in 1974.

Second. New agreements on the limitation of strategic offensive armaments will be based on the principles of the American-Soviet documents adopted in Moscow in May 1972 and the agreements reached in Washington in June 1973; and in particular, both Sides will be guided by the recognition of each other's equal security interests and by the recognition that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage, directly or indirectly, would be inconsistent with the strengthening of peaceful relations between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Third. The limitations placed on strategic offensive weapons can apply both to their quantitative aspects as well as to their qualitative improvement.

Fourth. Limitations on strategic offensive arms must be subject to adequate verification by national technical means.

Fifth. The modernization and replacement of strategic offensive arms would be permitted under conditions which will be formulated in the agreements to be concluded.

Sixth. Pending the completion of a permanent agreement on more complete measures of strategic offensive arms limitation, both Sides are prepared to reach agreements on separate measures to supplement the existing Interim Agreement of May 26, 1972.

Seventh. Each Side will continue to take necessary organizational and technical measures for preventing accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear

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weapons under its control in accordance with the Agreement of September 30, 1971 between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Washington, June 21, 1973

FOR THE UNITED STATES
OF AMERICA:

FOR THE UNION OF SOVIET
SOCIALIST REPUBLICS:

President of the United States
of America

General Secretary of the
Central Committee, CPSU.

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THE WHITE HOUSE

FACT SHEET

**BASIC PRINCIPLES OF NEGOTIATIONS ON THE FURTHER
LIMITATION OF STRATEGIC OFFENSIVE ARMS**

In today's agreement the President and General Secretary Brezhnev reinforced their commitment to permanent limits on strategic armaments and to an intensification of the negotiations. The two leaders signed a document of seven principles that provide fresh guidance to the negotiating teams, instructing them to work out a permanent agreement over the course of the next year, with the objective of concluding it in 1974. The principles contain the basic outline of a new agreement, that will now be filled in at the talks in Geneva.

Background

The negotiations on the limitation of strategic arms began in Helsinki in November 1969, dealing with both offensive and defensive strategic arms. The negotiations continued until May 1971, when the President and General Secretary Brezhnev reached an agreement that broke a deadlock over the scope of the agreement and the priorities to be followed. Negotiations resumed and continued through the summit meetings in Moscow last May. On May 26, 1972 the President and General Secretary signed the first two agreements limiting strategic weapons: a treaty restricting the deployment of anti-ballistic missile systems, and an Interim Agreement limiting intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The Interim Agreement has a duration of five years. The two agreements came into force officially on October 3, 1972 with the exchange of instruments of ratification of the ABM treaty in a ceremony in the White House, with the President and Foreign Minister Gromyko participating.

The negotiations resumed in November 1972 in Geneva, and recessed on June 12 to await the outcome of the discussions at the summit. The negotiations have been thorough and the progress in the talks thus far was noted in the preamble of the Basic Principles signed today.

OUTLINE OF THE PRINCIPLES

The First Principle:

Sets a target date of 1974 for completing a new agreement;

Affirms the intention of both sides to continue active negotiations over the course of the next year and to make a serious effort to work out a permanent agreement that is more complete in its limitations and that provides for subsequent reductions in strategic offensive arms.

The Second Principle:

Establishes that the fundamental guidelines for a permanent agreement will be a mutual recognition of the equal security interests of each side and a recognition that efforts to obtain unilateral advantage would be inconsistent with strengthening U. S. -Soviet relations; these guidelines are drawn from the Basic Principles signed in Moscow in May 1972; in effect they direct the negotiators to deal with each other's security interest, broadly defined, and not only with limits on individual weapons; agreements that effect or harm the interests of other countries would be ruled out by the Basic Principles of last May and by this principle.

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The Third Principle:

Allows for limits on both the numbers of strategic weapons as well as on the qualitative characteristics of these weapons; whereas the first agreement dealt with limiting the number of ICBMs, including limits on heavy ICBMs and a ceiling on SLBMs, the permanent agreement will be broader in nature and involve limits on certain technical capabilities, such as multiple independently targetted reentry vehicles (MIRVs).

The Fourth Principle:

Records the agreement that any limitation must be subject to adequate verification by national technical means; this confirms the basic approach to verification taken in the ABM treaty and the Interim Agreement.

The Fifth Principle:

Allows for modernization of individual weapons systems as well as their replacement; thus, both sides, over time, can retain confidence in their capabilities, but the conditions for introducing more modern systems and replacing old ones will be carefully negotiated.

The Sixth Principle:

Permits supplementary agreements that might be concluded immediately or in the very near term, even before the negotiations on the permanent agreement are completed; under this principle a specific area of competition could be temporarily halted, in order to hold open the possibility of permanent limits.

The Seventh Principle:

Reaffirms that both sides will continue to implement the agreement of September 30, 1971 that was designed to reduce the dangers of accidental or unauthorized use of nuclear weapons; its reaffirmation is intended to stress that this agreement remains part of the continuing process of strategic arms limitation.

In sum, this agreement on Basic Principles is a solemn commitment at the highest political level:

- to limit strategic offensive arms permanently;
- to complete an agreement in 1974;
- to broaden the scope of an agreement to include limits on qualitative improvements as well as numbers of weapons, and to provide for subsequent reductions;
- to allow for immediate agreements in areas where limiting competition may be urgent.

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